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Abstract. We study a Cournot duopoly model using Ferreira-Oliveira-Pinto’s
R&D investment function. We find the multiple perfect Nash equilibria and we
analyse the economical relevant quantities like output levels, prices, consumer
surplus, profits and welfare.
1. Introduction. In this paper we consider a Cournot duopoly competition model
where each of the firms invest in R&D projects to reduce its initial production costs
([4, 8]). This competition is modeled, as usual, by a two stages game (see [1]). In
the first subgame, two firms choose, simultaneously, the R&D investment strategies
and in the second subgame, the two firms are involved in a Cournot competition
with production costs equal to the reduced costs obtained in the previous stage. The
R&D investment function considered is the one introduced in [5]. We find the Nash
investment equilibria for the two stages game and study the economical impacts
resulting from having distinct equilibria ((see [2, 9])). As it is well known from the
literature, the second subgame consists of a Cournot competition and has a unique
Nash equilibrium. For the first subgame, consisting of an R&D investment program
there are at most four distinct Nash investment equilibria: (i) a Nash equilibrium
where both firms invest (see [1]); (ii) a Nash equilibrium where firm F1 invests
and firm F2 does not; (iii) a Nash equilibrium where firm F2 invests and firm F1
does not; (iv) a Nash equilibrium where neither of the firms invest. We consider a
competitive investment region C where both firms invest, a single investment region
S1 for firm F1 where just firm F1 invests, and a single investment region S2 for firm
F2 where just firm F2 invests. We observe that these regions can have non-empty
intersections, i.e. the strategic optimal investment equilibrium might not be unique.
2. The Cournot competition model. The Cournot competition with R&D in-
vestment programs consists of two subgames in one period of time (see [1]). We fully
characterize the perfect Nash equilibria of the game that is determined by the Nash
investment equilibria for the first subgame (non-unique) and the Nash equilibrium
output level for the second subgame (see [5]).
The first subgame is an R&D investment program, where both firms have initial
production costs and choose, simultaneously, their R&D investment strategies to
obtain new production costs. The second subgame is a standard Cournot duopoly
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competition with production costs equal to the reduced cost obtained in the previous
stage. We consider an economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, F1 and
F2, each one producing a differentiated good, where qi denotes the output quantity
of the firm Fi. In the region of quantity space where prices are positive, we assume
that the inverse demands are linear and the price pi of the good produced by the
firm Fi is given by
pi = α− βqi − γqj ,
where α, β > 0. Furthermore, we assume that the goods are substitutes, i.e. γ > 0
(see [11]).
The firm Fi invests an amount vi in an R&D program
ai : [0,+∞]× [cL, α]→ [ci − (ci − cL), ci]
that reduces its production cost ci to a new production cost ai = ai(vi, ci) given by
ai = ci − (ci − cL)vi
λ+ vi
. (1)
All the results presented hold in an open region of parameters (λ, α, β, γ) containing
the point (0.2, 10, 0.013, 0.013).
The profit pii(qi, qj) of firm Fi is given by:
pii(qi, qj) = pii(qi, qj ; v1, v2, c1, c2) = qi (α− βqi − γqj − ai)− vi, (2)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. Let
Ri =
2βα− γα− 2βai + γaj
4β2 − γ2 ,
with i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. As it is well-known (see [5, 7]), the Nash equilibrium
output level (q1, q2) is given by:
qi = qi(v1, v2; c1, c2) =

0, if Ri ≤ 0
Ri, if 0 < Ri <
α−aj
γ
α−ai
2β , if Ri ≥ α−ajγ
. (3)
At the Nash equilibrium output level, the price pi of firm Fi is given by
pi = pi(v1, v2; c1, c2) = α− βqi(v1, v2; c1, c2)− γqj(v1, v2; c1, c2).
Furthermore, the profit pii(v1, v2; c1, c2) of firm Fi is given by:
pii(v1, v2; c1, c2) =

−vi, if Ri ≤ 0
βR2i − vi, if 0 < Ri < α−ajγ
(α−ai)2
4β − vi, if Ri ≥ α−ajγ
. (4)
Given initial production costs c1 and c2, the sets Ai of new production costs for
firms F1 and F2 are given by:
Ai = Ai(c1, c2) = [ci − (ci − cL), ci],
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Figure 1. (A) Full characterization of the Nash investment re-
gions in terms of the firms’ initial production costs (c1, c2) ∈
[4, 10]2. The single investment regions S1 and S2 are shown in
blue and red, respectively; the competitive investment region C is
shown in green; and the Nil Nash investment region N is shown in
grey, dark blue and dark red. (B) Zoom of Figure (A) in the re-
gion (c1, c2) ∈ [9, 10]2. The intersection S1 ∩S2 between the region
S1 and the region S2 is shown in pink. The intersection S1 ∩ C
between the region S1 (respectively S2) and the region C is shown
in light blue (respectively light red); The intersection S1 ∩ C ∩ S2
between the region S1, the region S2 and the region C is shown in
light grey.
for i ∈ {1, 2}. The R&D cost reduction investment programs a1 and a2 of the firms
determine a bijection between the investment region R+0 ×R+0 of both firms and the
new production costs region A1 ×A2 given by the map
a = (a1, a2) : (R+0 )2 × [cL, α]2 −→ A1 ×A2
(v1, v2; c1, c2) 7−→ (a1(v1), a2(v2)),
where, due to the non-existence of spillovers
ai(vi) = ai(vi; ci, cj) = ci − (ci − cL)vi
λ+ vi
.
The new production costs region can be decomposed, at most, in three disconnected
economical regions characterized by the optimal output level of the firms: the mo-
nopoly region Mi of firm Fi; the duopoly region D characterized by the optimal
output levels of both firms being non-zero and consequently below their monopoly
output levels (see [5]).
The best investment response (multivalued) function V1 : R+0 × [cL, α]2 → R+0 of
firm F1 is given by:
V1(v2; c1, c2) = arg max
v1
pi1(v1, v2; c1, c2).
In [5], an explicit computational algorithm to find the best investment response
function Vi : R+0 → R+0 is presented.
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Figure 2. (A) Plot of the Nash investment v1 = v1(c1, c2) of
Firm F1 in terms of the initial production costs (c1, c2); (B) Plot
of the aggregated investments v = v1 + v2 of Firms F1 and F2 in
terms of the initial production costs (c1, c2); (C) Plot of the price
p1 = p1(v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2); c1, c2) of Firm F1 in terms of the initial
production costs (c1, c2) using the Nash investment equilibria
(v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2)).
The Nash investment equilibria are given by the (multivalued) function
v : [cL, α]
2 → (R+0 )2,
where v(c1, c2) = (v1, v2) are the solutions of the system:{
v1 = V1(v2; c1, c2)
v2 = V2(v1; c1, c2)
.
We find, at most, four distinct types of Nash investment equilibria (v1, v2): (i) a
competitive Nash equilibrium where both firms invest, i.e. v1 > 0 and v2 > 0; (ii)
a single Nash equilibrium of firm F1 where firm F1 invests and firm F2 does not,
i.e. v1 > 0 and v2 = 0; (iii) a single Nash equilibrium of firm F2 where firm F2
invests and firm F1 does not, i.e. v2 > 0 and v1 = 0; (iv) a Nil Nash equilibrium
where neither firm F1 neither firm F2 invest, i.e. v1 = 0 and v2 = 0 (see [5]). We
define a competitive investment region C consisting of Nash investment equilibria
where both firms invest, a single investment region S1 for firm F1, consisting of
Nash investment equilibria where just firm F1 invests, a single investment region
S2 for firm F2, consisting of Nash investment equilibria where just firm F2 invests
and a nil investment region N where neither of the firms invest (see [5]).
We note that in every figure of this paper we use the same colors to identify the
different regions. The single investment regions S1 and S2 are shown in blue and
red, respectively. The competitive investment region C is shown in green. The Nil
Nash investment region N is shown in grey, dark blue and dark red. The intersection
S1 ∩S2 between the region S1 and the region S2 is shown in pink. The intersection
S1 ∩ C between the region S1 (respectively S2) and the region C is shown in light
blue (respectively light red); The intersection S1 ∩ C ∩ S2 between the region S1,
the region S2 and the region C is shown in light grey (see the right hand figure).
3. Investment analysis. We are going to study the Nash investment equilibria
v : [cL, α]
2 → (R+0 )2. Let us denote v(c1, c2) by (v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2)) (see Figure
2).
If the new production costs (a1(v1), a2(v2)) ∈ M2, then the Nash investment
equilibrium v1 of firm F1 is v1 = 0 (see Figure 2).
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Figure 3. (A) Plot of the output level q1 =
q1(v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2); c1, c2) of Firm F1 in terms of the ini-
tial production costs (c1, c2) using the Nash investment equilibria
(v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2)); (B) Plot of the aggregated output levels
Q = q1 + q2 of Firms F1 and F2 in terms of the initial production
costs (c1, c2) using the Nash investment equilibria
(v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2)).
Let ηi = (ci−cL), L1 = 6βλ2−λη21−η1λ(α−c1) and N1 = 2βλ3 − η1λ2(α− c1).
If the new production costs (a1(v1), a2(v2)) ∈ M1, then the Nash investment equi-
librium v1 of firm F1 is a solution of the following polynomial equation (see [5]):
2βv31 + 6βλv
2
1 + L1v1 +N1 = 0. (5)
Let Ai = 4β
2ηiλ, Gi = −2βηiλ, Hi = γηiλ, C = (4β2 − γ2)2, Ei = α− ci + ηi
and Fi = 2βEi − γEj . Let Ii = −AiFiC−1, Ji = −AiHiC−1 and Ki = −AiGiC−1.
If the new production costs (a1(v1), a2(v2)) ∈ D, then the Nash investment equilib-
rium v1 of firm F1 is a solution of the following polynomial equation (see [5]):
J31 v
3
1 + (J1(I2v1 + J2)−K2)(v31 + I1v1 +K1)2 = 0. (6)
4. Profit and welfare analysis. We study the output levels q1, the prices p1
and the profits pi1 of Firm F1 depending upon the initial production costs (c1, c2),
when both firms choose to invest accordingly with the Nash investment equilibria
(v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2)). We find the consumer surplus cs1 of the consumers of firm
F1 and the consumer surplus cs = cs1 + cs2 of the consumers of both firms de-
pending upon the initial production costs (c1, c2), when both firms choose to invest
accordingly with the Nash investment equilibria (v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2)). We analyse
the welfare w1 = cs1 + pi1 of the market of firm F1 and the welfare w = w1 + w2
of the consumers of both firms depending upon the initial production costs (c1, c2),
when both firms choose to invest accordingly with the Nash investment equilibria
(v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2)).
Let qi = qi(v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2); c1, c2) be the output level of Firm Fi in terms of
the production costs (c1, c2) using the Nash investment equilibria (v1(c1, c2), v2(c1,
c2)) (see Figure 3A). The marginal rate of the output level qi with respect to the
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Figure 4. (A) Plot of the profit pi1 =
pi1(v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2); c1, c2) of Firm F1 in terms of the ini-
tial production costs (c1, c2) using the Nash investment equilibria
(v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2)); (B) Plot of the aggregate profit pi = pi1 + pi2
in terms of the initial production costs (c1, c2) using the Nash
investment equilibria (v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2)).
production costs ci is given by:
dqi
dci
=

ηiλ
2β(λ+vi)2
∂vi
∂ci
, if (ai(vi), aj(vj)) ∈Mi
2βηiλ
(4β2−γ2)(λ+vi)2
∂vi
∂ci
− γ(ci−cL)λ(4β2−γ2)(λ+vj)2
∂vj
∂ci
, if (ai(vi), aj(vj)) ∈ D
0, if (ai(vi), aj(vj)) ∈Mj
(7)
Let pi = pi(v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2); c1, c2) be the price of Firm Fi in terms of the
production costs (c1, c2) using the Nash investment equilibria (v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2))
(see Figure 3C). The marginal rate of the price pi with respect to the production
costs ci is given by:
dpi
dci
=

− ηiλ2(λ+vi)2 ∂vi∂ci , if (ai(vi), aj(vj)) ∈Mi
− 2β2ηiλ(4β2−γ2)(λ+vi)2 ∂vi∂ci +
βγ(ci−cL)λ
(4β2−γ2)(λ+vj)2
∂vj
∂ci
, if (ai(vi), aj(vj)) ∈ D
0, if (ai(vi), aj(vj)) ∈Mj
. (8)
Let pii = pii(v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2); c1, c2) be the profit of Firm Fi in terms of the
production costs (c1, c2) using the Nash investment equilibria (v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2))
(see Figure 4A). The marginal rate of the profit pii with respect to the production
costs ci is given by:
∂pii
∂ci
=
qi∂pi
∂ci
+
pi∂qi
∂ci
.
The consumer surplus csi = csi(v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2), c1, c2) of the consumers of
firm Fi (see Figure 5A) is given by:
csi = (βiq
2
i )/2. (9)
In Figure 5C we present the welfare wi = wi(v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2), c1, c2) of the
market of firm Fi .
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Figure 5. (A) Plot of the consumer surplus cs1 of Firm F1 in
terms of the initial production costs (c1, c2) using the Nash invest-
ment equilibria (v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2)); (B) Plot of the aggregate
consumer surplus cs = cs1 + cs2 of Firm F1 in terms of the ini-
tial production costs (c1, c2) using the Nash investment equilibria
(v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2)); (C) Plot of the welfare w1 of firm F1 in terms
of the initial production costs (c1, c2) using the Nash investment
equilibria (v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2)); (D) Plot of the aggregate welfare
w = w1 + w2 in terms of the initial production costs (c1, c2) using
the Nash investment equilibria (v1(c1, c2), v2(c1, c2)).
5. Conclusions. In this paper we studied the mathematical and economical prop-
erties of the multiple perfect Nash equilibria of a Cournot duopoly competition
model where each of the firms invest in R&D projects to reduce its initial produc-
tion costs. We analysed the output levels q1, the prices p1 and the profits pi1 of
Firm F1; the consumer surplus cs1 of the consumers of firm F1; and the welfare
w1 = cs1 + pi1 of the market of firm F1. Furthermore, we analysed the aggregated
output levels Q = q1 + q2 and the aggregated profits pi = pi1 + pi2 of both firms; the
aggregated consumer surplus cs = cs1 + cs2 of the consumers of both firms and the
aggregated welfare w = w1 + w2 of the full market.
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